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HEIGHTENED SECURITY:  
THE NEED TO INCORPORATE ARTICLES 3BIS(1)(A) 
AND 8BIS(5)(E) OF THE 2005 DRAFT SUA PROTOCOL 
INTO PART VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
Caitlin A. Harrington† 
Abstract:  Maritime terrorism on the Pacific Ocean is a growing threat.  Terrorists 
can take advantage of widening gaps in the world’s maritime security regime.  The 
current incarnation of the legal framework surrounding the nonflag-state right of visit has 
exacerbated emerging weaknesses.  The world must be willing to allow nonflag states 
greater power to board vessels on the high seas that are suspected of participating in 
maritime terrorism.  
The ship-boarding procedures within the 2005 Draft Protocol to the 1988 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation are a step in the right direction.  They do not go far enough, however, toward 
increasing maritime security.   
To effectively combat maritime terrorism, the international community should 
amend the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, incorporating Article 
3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) of the 2005 Draft Protocol into Part VII of the 
Convention.  This would create an additional exception to the principle of exclusive flag-
state jurisdiction and control on the high seas, allowing for a nonflag-state right of visit 
given reasonable grounds to suspect that a ship has committed, is committing, or is about 
to commit an act of maritime terrorism as defined by Article 3bis(1)(a). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Widening gaps in maritime security have resulted in weaknesses ripe 
for exploitation by terrorist organizations targeting the waters of the Pacific 
Ocean.  The danger of maritime terrorism has become increasingly clear.  A 
member of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization, a group with ties to 
Al Qa’ida, has admitted to the Indonesia National Intelligence Agency that 
the waters of Southeast Asia have emerged as a potential target.1  In a 
separate incident, Barbar Ahmad, another terrorist linked to Al Qa’ida, was 
discovered with a set of plans outlining the vulnerabilities of American naval 
fleets, raising fears of a maritime terrorist attack.2   
                                           
† The author would like to thank Ximena Heinrich, legal officer at the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea, for encouraging her interest in this topic during her legal internship at the tribunal, 
Professor Kristin Stilt for serving as her University of Washington School of Law advisor, her editors at the 
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their work, and her friends and family for their support and 
inspiration.  Any errors or omissions are the author’s own.  
1  Joshua Ho, The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia, MIL. TECH., May 1, 2005, at 14, 15. 
2  Id. 
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International terrorist organizations have strengthened their maritime 
presence.  Recent estimates are that Osama bin Laden and those associated 
with him control a dozen to fifty freighters.3  Al-Qa’ida, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaff Group, Jemaah Islamiyah, the Kumpulan 
Militan Malaysia, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, and Laskar Jihad are all 
suspected of planning or undertaking maritime attacks in the Asia Pacific 
region.4  Reports also indicate a growing interest on the part of Al-Qa’ida, 
Jemaah Islamiyah and the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia to launch terrorist 
attacks targeting global trade and the U.S. Navy.5  
Although many of the potential targets of maritime terrorism lie in the 
coastal waters and ports of nation states, effective control over the high seas 
remains a vital element in the prevention of attacks.  Pursuant to the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), the vast majority 
of the world’s oceans are classified as the high seas.  Therefore, it is likely 
that terrorist vessels, even those whose eventual targets lie closer to the 
shoreline, will travel through the high seas.  
Terrorists, taking advantage of weak international enforcement, can 
also directly target ships traveling on the high seas.  In the words of U.S. 
Admiral Walter F. Doran, “terrorism, like water, flows through the paths of 
least resistance.”6  This comment argues that, under the current international 
legal framework, the international community has very little power to resist 
a terror attack on the high seas.  
Weak flag-state7 control over vessels traveling on the high seas creates 
gaps in maritime security, exacerbating the threat of maritime terrorism.  
UNCLOS codifies the exclusive right of flag states to exercise jurisdiction 
and control over their vessels traveling on the high seas.  While UNCLOS 
provides a limited number of exceptions allowing for a nonflag-state right of 
visit given specific circumstances, none of the exceptions focuses on the 
prevention of a maritime terrorist attack. 
Under current international law of the sea, nonflag states must gain 
flag-state permission to board a suspect vessel on the high seas or rely upon 
the flag state to ensure that the vessel is not involved in terrorist activity.  
Flag states exert varying levels of regulation and enforcement over their 
                                           
3  Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the 
Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 131, 145 (2005).  
4  U.S. Urges Nations to Sign Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Terrorism, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 12, 
2005.  
5  Id.  
6  Admiral Walter F. Doran, 18th Asialink Lecture Address, Sept. 9, 2003, available at 
http://www.cpf.navy.mil/speeches/030909.htm.  
7  For a description of flag states, see infra comment II(B)(1).  
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ships.  So-called “flags of convenience” are those of flag states that fail to 
strictly monitor and enforce international law on their vessels.  To prevent a 
maritime terrorist attack, the international community clearly must rectify 
the weaknesses in maritime security created by inadequate flag-state 
enforcement. 
The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA Convention”) and the 2005 Draft 
Protocol to the SUA Convention (“2005 Draft Protocol”) are both attempts 
to strengthen international maritime security.  The director for operations 
policy of the United States Coast Guard, Rear Admiral Wayne Justice, 
describes the 2005 Draft Protocol as providing “unprecedented tools” that 
will counteract the threat of maritime terrorism if and when it enters into 
force.8 
This comment focuses on Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) of 
the 2005 Draft Protocol (“Article 3bis(1)(a)” and “Article 8bis(5)(e)”).  It 
argues that while the ship-boarding provisions of the 2005 Draft Protocol 
increase international maritime security, they do not create a strong-enough 
defense against maritime terrorism.  The international community should 
amend UNCLOS Part VII, incorporating the definition of maritime terrorism 
contained within Article 3bis(1)(a) and the ship-boarding procedure of 
Article 8bis(5)(e) into the Convention.  This would create a nonflag-state 
right of visit on the high seas given reasonable suspicion of a ship’s 
involvement in terrorist activity.  
Part II of this comment outlines the increasing danger posed by 
maritime terrorism on the Pacific Ocean and the failure of the ship-boarding 
procedures codified in UNCLOS to adequately respond to this threat.  Part 
III discusses how the 2005 Draft Protocol, through Article 3bis and Article 
8bis, attempts to prevent maritime terrorism.  Part IV analyzes Article 
3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e), finding that they endeavor to strengthen 
maritime security while working within established international law, 
including the current UNCLOS framework. Part V argues that the 
international community should amend Part VII of UNCLOS, incorporating 
Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into the convention.  This would 
create a nonflag-state right of visit on the high seas given reasonable 
grounds to suspect that a vessel has committed, is committing, or is about to 
commit an act of maritime terrorism as defined by Article 3bis(1)(a).  
                                           
8  U.S. Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT) Holds A Joint Subcommittee Hearing On 
International Maritime Security, CAP. TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 13, 2005.  
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II. INTERNATIONAL LAW GUIDELINES ON THE NONFLAG STATE RIGHT OF 
VISIT ON THE HIGH SEAS ARE TOO LIMITED TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT 
AGAINST THE GROWING FORCE OF MARITIME TERRORISM 
The threat of maritime terrorism is a grave concern.  Weaknesses in 
international security created by limitations on high-seas ship boarding have 
exacerbated the problem.  The international community should incorporate 
Article 8bis(5)(e) and Article 3bis(1)(a) into UNCLOS Part VII, creating a 
nonflag-state right of visit on the high seas given reasonable grounds to 
suspect a ship’s involvement in terrorism. 
This comment recognizes that it is likely that future terrorist attacks 
will occur within the ports and the territorial waters of states.  It focuses, 
however, on the ability of the international community to board vessels on 
the high seas before they reach their targets. 
A. Maritime Terrorism on the Pacific Ocean Is an Increasing Threat to 
International Peace and Security 
The international community has become increasingly concerned with 
maritime terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks 
against the United States.9  International specialists fear that terrorists will 
“exploit[]” the ocean to “simultaneously facilitate terrorist logistical and 
operational designs.”10  
The importance of effective security on the world’s oceans has 
become especially imperative “for the United States and Canada, member 
states of the European Union, Australia and New Zealand, and for China, 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and other economies in 
East Asia that have extensive direct seaborne trade with the U.S., Europe, 
and other industrialized nations.”11 
In contrast to current concerns, maritime terrorism has not posed a 
large historical threat to international security.  The RAND Terrorism 
Chronology Database and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident state that 
“seaborne strikes . . . constituted only 2 percent of all international incidents 
                                           
9 Michael Richardson, Drugs and Terrorism Roams [sic] the High Seas Under Tuvaluan Flag, THE 
STRAIGHT TIMES, May 22, 2003, available at http://www.tuvaluislands.com/news/archived/2003/2003-05-
21.htm.  
10 Peter Chalk, Maritime Terrorism in the Contemporary Era: Threat and Potential Future 
Contingencies, in THE MIPT TERRORISM ANNUAL 2006, 19, 20 (2006) available at 
http://www.tkb.org/documents/Downloads/2006-MIPT-Terrorism-Annual.pdf.   
11 Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Institute of South East Asian Studies Viewpoints, 2 (Feb. 25, 2004) 
available at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/mricsumfeb04.pdf. 
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of the last thirty years.”12  The past lack of maritime terrorism may be 
explained by a simple cost-benefit analysis: “in a world of finite human and 
material assets, the costs and unpredictability associated with expanding to 
the maritime realm have typically trumped any potential benefits.”13 
Unfortunately, the appeal of maritime terrorism has increased for 
several reasons.  First, due the increased strength of international media, “it 
is now far more probable that attacks at sea will elicit the necessary exposure 
and publicity that terrorists crave.”14  Second, it has become easier for 
potential terrorists to “gain basic skills and equipment for seaborne 
attacks.”15  Third, even if terrorists are unable to obtain the skills themselves, 
they may “be able to overcome existing shortcomings in seaborne attack 
capabilities by contracting out to pirate syndicates.”16  Finally, it has become 
increasing clear that global shipping is vulnerable “as a result of the largely 
unpoliced nature of the high seas,” the lack of enough “serious programs of 
coastal surveillance, and the sheer esoteric character that typifies much of 
the oceanic environment.”17 
The list of terrorist organizations that have “moved to conspicuously 
integrate waterborne modalities into their overall logistical and attack 
mandates” is extensive.18  It includes the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the 
Lebanese Hezbollah, Abu Sayyaf Group, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Jamaat al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad, and Al 
Qa’ida.19  Intelligence agencies of the United States and Norway have 
identified numerous freighters flagged under the registries of “Yemen, 
Somalia, and the Pacific Island of Tonga” that they believe to be “owned or 
controlled by the Al [Qa’ida] network.”20   
A maritime terrorist attack in the Pacific Ocean could take on a 
number of manifestations in addition to a traditional attack against a ship 
traveling through the region’s waters.  As ports have become “critical nodes 
of global seaborne trade,” they have emerged as tempting terrorist targets.21  
For example, terrorists could work with the region’s pirates, hijacking 
                                           
12 Chalk, supra note 10 at 21.  
13 Id. 
14 Id., at 23. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id., at 22.  
18 Id., at 29-30. 
19 Id.  
20 Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO, ENERGY SECURITY (prepared by the Institute 
for the Analysis of Global Security), Jan. 24, 2005, available at http://www.iags.org/n0124051.htm 
[hereinafter ENERGY SECURITY].  
21 Ho, supra note 1, at 15. 
112 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 1 
 
liquefied natural gas carriers and transforming them into “floating bombs to 
disable ports.”22  Terrorists also could attack vital ports with “dirty bombs” 
smuggled in shipping containers.23   
In addition to transiting through the high seas on their way to or from 
launching an attack closer to shore, a terrorist organization could target a 
vessel traveling on the high seas.  International fear of such an attack 
increased in October 2002 with the detainment of Abd al Rahman al Nashiri, 
the man who many “believe[] to have been responsible for the attack on the 
USS Cole.”24  Along with learning that Al Qaeda had begun “preparations to 
attack ships in the Mediterranean,” the international community also 
uncovered “a dossier captured with Nashiri” naming “cruise liners sailing 
from Western ports [as] ‘targets of opportunity.’”25 
Recent attacks in Southeast Asia illustrate the danger inherent in the 
failure to prevent a maritime terrorist attack.  Since 2000, a number of 
maritime terrorist attacks have shocked the region.  In February 2000, forty 
people were killed and fifty wounded when the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front bombed the Our Lady Mediatrix, a Philippine ferry.26  Less than two 
years later, in December 2001, an Indonesian ferry, the Kalifornia, was 
bombed while sailing through the country’s Maluku Archipelago, killing ten 
individuals and injuring forty-six more.27  The attack on the Kalifornia was 
not a solitary act of violence but rather the beginning of “a cycle of 
violence” resulting in attacks on several other vessels.28  Unrelated to the 
Kalifornia tragedy, another one hundred and sixteen people died in the 
February 2004 sinking of the Super Ferry close to Manila, an attack for 
which the terrorist organization Abu Sayyaff has taken responsibility.29  
Finally, although not an act of maritime terrorism, the triple nightclub 
bombing that shook Bali on October 12, 2002, is symbolic of the strength of 
terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia.30 
Terrorists target vessels not only for attack.  The So San incident 
awoke the world to the ease with which vessels could be used to transport 
weapons of mass destruction and other terrorist materials.  This comment 
does not address the transportation of weapons of mass destruction.  The So 
                                           
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 ENERGY SECURITY, supra note 20.  
25 Id.  
26 John F. Bradford, The Growing Prospects For Maritime Security Cooperation In Southeast Asia, 
58 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 63, 67 (2005). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id., at 71. 
30 Id., at 67. 
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San incident, however, demonstrates that weapons used to carry out 
maritime terrorist attacks can be hidden within seemingly legitimate cargo.  
In December 2002, the Spanish Navy, acting on information provided 
by the United States, boarded the So San.31  Though the vessel was 
registered in Cambodia, the nonflag-state boarding was allowed under 
UNCLOS Article 110 because the ship flew no flag and had concealed its 
name with paint.32  The So San had originated in North Korea33 and at the 
time it was interdicted was on the high seas six hundred miles off the 
Yemeni coast.34  The Spanish Navy uncovered fifteen SCUD missiles buried 
beneath the So San’s declared cargo of cement.35  Although the So San was 
eventually allowed to continue onto its destination, following a declaration 
by Yemen that it had bought the weapons from North Korea, it illustrated the 
ease with which terrorists could move weapons of mass destruction through 
the high seas.36  
B. Existing International Ocean Law Has Not Adequately Responded to 
Threats Posed by Maritime Terrorism 
International law, specifically the UNCLOS codification of the flag-
state right of jurisdiction and control on the high seas, has proven inadequate 
to meet the threat of terrorism.  There is no uniformity in the level and 
quality of regulations imposed by different flag states.  Flag states with poor 
enforcement mechanisms create weaknesses in international security that 
may be exploited by maritime terrorists.  UNCLOS provides a very limited 
number of circumstances under which a nonflag state may board a vessel 
traveling on the high seas, none of which apply to the prevention of 
maritime terrorism.    
                                           
31 Thomas D. Lehrman, Enhancing the Proliferation Security Initiative: The Case for a 
Decentralized Nonproliferation Architecture, 45 VA. J.  INT’L L. 223, 224 (2004).  
32 Becker, supra note 3 at 152-53. 
33 Id. 
34 Lehrman, supra note 31 at 224.  
35 Becker, supra note 3 at 153. 
36 Lehrman, supra note 31 at 224.  
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1. The UNCLOS Codification of Flag-State Power Leaves Too Much 
Discretion and Authority to Flag States to Register Ships and to 
Enforce International Law on those Vessels 
Every nation has the inherent right “to sail ships flying its flag on the 
high seas.”37  Ships experience varying levels of enforcement of 
international law depending on the state whose flag they fly.  
Notwithstanding exceptional circumstances, a vessel may fly the flag of only 
one state throughout the course of its journey.38  
Nations develop their own criteria for flagging ships.  Pursuant to 
UNCLOS Article 91, every flag state has the responsibility to “fix the 
conditions for the grant of its nationality.”39  UNCLOS Article 91 places a 
single requirement on the flagging of vessels, stating that “[t]here must be a 
genuine link between the State and the ship.”40  UNCLOS never precisely 
defines the concept of a “genuine link,” a definition that differs widely 
among nations.  Historically, traditional flag states, applying strict rules, 
registered only those vessels owned by their own nationals.41  
Today, flag-state ship registries range from open registries to closed 
registries.  These two types of registration systems roughly define the 
spectrum of ways in which the concept of a “genuine link” has been 
interpreted.  Closed-registry nations register vessels based upon a set of 
“strict criteria.”42  Open registry states are remarkably different.  They often 
impose lax restrictions and regulations, prompting criticism that effectively 
they “rent out their flags” to ship owners willing to pay to register their 
vessels.43  Open registries also may offer discounts on volume, an absence of 
manning requirements, fewer strict shipping regulations, and decreased 
taxes.44  
While there are economic benefits for ship owners who register with 
an open registry, the flag state also gains income through the operation of 
such a registry.45  A 2003 report by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development describes the impact that open registries have 
had upon the definition of a “genuine link,” stating, “the linkage requirement 
                                           
37 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 90, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS].  
38 Id., art. 92.  
39 Id., art. 91. 
40 Id.  
41 INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FEDERATION, STEERING THE RIGHT COURSE 11 (2003). 
42 Becker, supra note 3 at 142.  
43 INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FEDERATION, supra note 41 at 11.  
44 Julie A. Perkins, Ship Registers: An International Update, 22 TUL. MAR. L.J. 197, 197 (1997). 
45 Id. 
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has been widely accepted as being met by nothing more than a commercial, 
fee-for-service relationship between the owner and the Flag State.”46  The 
term “flags of convenience” is used within the context of open registries; a 
flag of convenience implies “registration for primarily economic reasons in a 
country with an open registry.”47 
The identity of a vessel’s flag state directly affects the level of 
regulation and enforcement that it will encounter while on the high seas.  
Flag states, those with both open registries and closed registries, generally 
exercise “exclusive” jurisdiction over their vessels sailing on the high seas.48  
They relinquish this control only in rare occasions, such as involving the 
right of visit and hot pursuit, expressly stated in UNCLOS or in international 
treaties.49  
While a flag state may utilize its own interpretation of a “genuine 
link,” it must also comply with a set of duties imposed by UNCLOS.  The 
responsibilities of a flag state require it to exercise its jurisdiction in an 
effective manner, controlling all “administrative, technical and social matters 
over ships flying its flag.”50  Additionally, UNCLOS Article 94 codifies the 
requirement that a flag state act in conformity with “generally accepted 
international regulations, procedures and practices,” taking all necessary 
steps “to secure their observance.”51  
It is well established that terrorism endangers international peace and 
security52 and is counter to established international law.  Therefore, a flag 
state may not allow its ships to engage in terrorist violence in a manner that 
would violate international regulations, procedures, and practices.  While a 
state will, theoretically, bear international responsibility if it breaches this 
duty, there are no external enforcement mechanism to ensure flag-state 
compliance. 
                                           
46 INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FEDERATION, supra note 41, at 16 (quoting Organization 
of Economic Co-Operation and Development, The Ownership and Control of Ships (March 2003)).  
47 H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics, 
and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 157 (1996).  
48 UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 92.  
49 Id., art. 110; id., art. 111.  
50 Id., art. 94.  
51 Id.   
52 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th Meeting, Supp., at 1, S/RESS/1373 (2001) [hereinafter S.C. 
Res. 1373]. 
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2. UNCLOS Does Not Grant Nonflag States a Right of Visit on the High 
Seas When a Vessel Is Suspected of Terrorist Activity 
As a general rule, flag states have exclusive jurisdiction over their 
vessels sailing on the high seas.  There are limited circumstances under 
which a nonflag state may exercise a right of visit.  UNCLOS Article 110 
codifies these limitations: a nonflag state may board a vessel traveling on the 
high seas given reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel is involved in 
piracy, engaged in the slave trade, broadcasting without authority, or sailing 
without a flag.53   
UNCLOS Article 110 is as significant for what it leaves out as for 
what it includes. It does not allow a nonflag state to board a vessel on the 
high seas based upon a reasonable suspicion that it has engaged in, is 
engaging in, or is about to engage in terrorist activity.   
UNCLOS Article 110 does include a broad exception analogous to 
that contained within UNCLOS Article 92.  It allows nonflag states to board 
a vessel in instances “where acts of interference derive from powers 
conferred by treaty.”54  Because neither UNCLOS Article 92 nor UNCLOS 
Article 110 allow for a nonflag state to board a vessel based upon a 
reasonable suspicion of its participation in maritime terrorism, states must, 
currently, create separate treaties that allow for boarding under such a 
circumstance.  
C. The Proliferation of Flags of Convenience Combined with the Extreme 
Limitations on the Nonflag-State Right of Visit on the High Seas Has 
Created a Situation Ripe for Maritime Terrorism 
The existence of flags of convenience assumes a more ominous tone 
when considered in conjunction with rising levels of maritime terrorism.  
Though open registries may once have been perceived as a way to allow ship 
owners to avoid burdensome regulations, they have “now taken on a 
frightening new persona.”55  As was recognized in a 1981 United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development report, strict enforcement is not 
compatible with the goals of registries whose sole purpose is to make a 
profit.56  
                                           
53 UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 110. 
54 Id.  
55 Maria J. Wing, Rethinking the Easy Way Out: Flags of Convenience in the Post-September 11th 
Era, 28 TUL. MAR. L.J. 173, 173 (2003). 
56 Anderson, supra note 47 at 165.  
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Options under UNCLOS to exercise a nonflag-state high-seas right of 
visit based upon a reasonable suspicion of a ship’s participation in maritime 
terrorism range from limited to nonexistent.  This creates a widening gap in 
maritime security.  Terrorist organizations may register their ships with a 
flag state that has a history of weak enforcement.  If the established 
enforcement pattern continues, and the flag state once again fails to inspect 
ships or to ensure compliance with international law, the terrorists are 
subject to no enforcement of international law.  
In a March 2004 resolution, the United Nations General Assembly 
recognized the danger posed by weak flag-state enforcement.57  The 
resolution focused on states that lack the necessary maritime administration 
and legal framework to ensure international compliance with the 
enforcement responsibilities designated to them by international law.58  The 
General Assembly urged such states, until they strengthen their enforcement 
mechanisms, “to consider declining the granting of the right to fly their flag 
to new vessels, suspending their registry or not opening a registry.”59  In 
addition, the General Assembly has invited the International Maritime 
Organization to examine the relationship between the requirement for a 
“genuine link” and the responsibility of flag states to control the vessels 
flying their flags.60 
III. THE 2005 DRAFT PROTOCOL IS AN ATTEMPT TO MEET EVOLVING 
MARITIME SECURITY CONCERNS 
The international community created the 2005 Draft Protocol to 
address weaknesses in maritime security resulting from poor flag-state 
enforcement and from limitations on the nonflag-state right of visit on the 
high seas.  Article 3bis and Article 8bis of the 2005 Draft Protocol attempt to 
strengthen maritime security while working within the existing UNCLOS 
framework.  To adequately protect against maritime terrorism, however, the 
international community must be willing to amend UNCLOS to allow for a 
nonflag-state right of visit on the high seas given reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a vessel has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an 
act of maritime terrorism.  
                                           
57 G.A. Res. 240, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., para. 27, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/240 (2004) [hereinafter 
G.A. Res. 58/240]. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 United Nations, Advance, Unedited Reporting Material on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 27 
(Feb. 27, 2004) available at http://www.iucn.org/places/medoffice/CDGovernance/conten/2-tallerexpertos/ 
conten/d/UNSGtoUNGAmarch04.pdf; G.A. Res. 58/240, supra note 57 at para. 28. 
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A. The International Community Created the 2005 Draft Protocol in an 
Effort to Confront the Increasing Danger Posed by Maritime 
Terrorism 
The 2005 Draft Protocol amends the 1988 SUA Convention.  The 
Draft Protocol attempts to strengthen the international community’s ability 
to prevent maritime terrorism.  Catalyzed by the attacks against the United 
States on September 11, 2001, the 2005 Draft Protocol emerged when the 
world realized the growing threat that maritime terrorism posed to the safety 
of navigation.   
1. The SUA Convention, Precursor to the 2005 Draft Protocol, Was 
Written to Ensure that the Perpetrators of Maritime Terrorism Would 
Be Brought to Justice 
Adopted on March 10, 1988,61 the SUA Convention was created in 
response to the fear that ships traveling on the high seas were tempting 
targets for international terrorists.  International Maritime Organization 
(“IMO”) members were responsible for creating the SUA Convention. The 
166-member IMO is a specialized U.N. agency that focuses on international 
shipping.62 
The October 198563 terrorist hijacking of the cruise ship Achille 
Lauro, during which an elderly, disabled passenger was murdered, catalyzed 
the SUA Convention’s development.64  In November 1986, Austria, Egypt, 
and Italy issued a proposal asking the IMO to call an international 
conference to draft a convention focused on stopping illegal actions against 
maritime navigation.65  Accordingly, the convention’s purpose is “to ensure 
that appropriate judicial action is taken against persons committing unlawful 
acts against ships.”66  It was written to guarantee that, through prosecution 
                                           
61 Summary of International Maritime Organization Conventions, available at http://www.uscg.mil/ 
international/affairs/Publications/MMSCode/english/AppendC.htm [hereinafter Summary of IMO 
Conventions]. 
62 Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, Treaty Amended to Outlaw WMD at Sea, 35 ARMS 
CONTROL TODAY 36, 36 (2005) available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/Dec-WMDsea.asp.  
63 Christ Trelawney, Enhancing Port and Ship Security, in Proceedings of the Pakistan Trade and 
Transport Facilitation 2003 Conference (Dec. 6, 2003) available at  http://www.nttfc.org/proceed03/ 
proc03-trelawney.htm. 
64 Recognising a Dangerous World, LLOYD’S LIST INT’L, Oct. 5, 2005.  
65 Trelawney, supra note 63. 
66 Frank Kennedy, Sea Views: Iacs Warns Over Inconsistent PSC Information, GULFNEWS.COM, Oct. 
28, 2001, available at http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/01/10/28/30643.html. 
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and extradition, there would be no shelter for individuals who commit illegal 
acts contrary to “the safety of navigation.”67  
Unlawful acts are defined to encompass a broad range of activities 
including forceful seizure, violent acts against individuals on ships, and the 
placing of destructive devices aboard a ship.68  The SUA Convention targets 
actions that may negatively impact the navigation of vessels and requires the 
domestic criminalization of such acts in the national laws of its parties as 
well as their cooperation in the prosecution of violators.69 
As of 2004, the SUA Convention had been ratified by 104 states that 
together represented 81.52 percent of the world’s tonnage.70  In August 
2005, the number of state parties had increased to 126.71  
2. The 2005 Draft Protocol Developed in Response to the Growing 
Threat of International Maritime Terrorism 
Negotiations for the development of the 2005 SUA Protocol arose in 
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United 
States.  In Resolution A.924(22), issued November 2001, the IMO General 
Assembly recognized the need to review the measures and procedures 
intended to prevent maritime terrorism.72  IMO Secretary General William 
O’Neal stated that “the shocking events of September 11th could not be 
ignored by an international organisation, such as the IMO which has, as an 
integral part of its mandate, the duty to make travel and transport by sea as 
safe as possible.”73 
The IMO Legal Committee sought to strengthen the SUA Convention 
through amendments that would respond to the dangers posed by 
international terrorism to maritime navigation.74  During the Eighty-fifth 
Session of the IMO, the IMO Legal Committee conducted an exchange of 
viewpoints on proposed amendments to the SUA Convention.75  The work of 
                                           
67 International Conference Adopts Revised Treaties to Address Unlawful Acts at Sea, 28 OIL SPILL 
INTELLIGENCE REPORT 1, 1 (Oct. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Oil Spill Intelligence Report]. 
68 Kennedy, supra note 66. 
69 J. Ashley Roach, Enhancing Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, 59 J. 
INT’L AFF. 97, 105 (2005). 
70 IMO Wins the Day on Stop and Search Update, LLOYDS LIST INT’L, Apr. 26, 2004.  
71 Roach, supra note 69 at 105.  
72 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), SUA-2 available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/ 
inven/pdfs/maritime.pdf. 
73 Kennedy, supra note 66. 
74 United States and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Consideration of a Draft 
Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, 1988, Sept. 20, 2005 [hereinafter U.S. Consideration of a Draft Protocol].  
75 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, supra note 72 at SUA-2.  
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the IMO Legal Committee continued throughout the Eighty-sixth and 
Eighty-seventh IMO sessions.76  During the Eighty-eighth Session of the 
IMO, held in April 2004, most of the participating nations stated their 
support for the development of the 2005 Protocol.77  However, several 
delegations raised the possibility of a conflict with established ocean law 
when they stressed the importance of ensuring that the SUA Protocol would 
not threaten the right of innocent passage or the freedom of navigation.78   
The United States strongly pushed for the development of the 2005 
Draft Protocol.  During the IMO Legal Committee’s meeting in April of 
2005, the United States, as the lead delegation, proposed adding a number of 
clauses that focused on broadening the range of potential offenses.79  The 
efforts of the United States were successful; Article 3bis of the 2005 Draft 
Protocol expands the offenses covered by the SUA Convention.80  They now 
include violent attacks against vessels as well as ocean transport of explosive 
and nuclear material given the intent that they be used in terrorist activity.81   
The support of the United States continued in September 2005 when it 
issued a Joint Comment with the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions focused on the proposed 2005 Draft Protocol.82  The Joint Comment 
tied the 2005 Draft Protocol to a growth in international treaty law, stating 
that it would be “an additional tool to combat the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.”83  The Joint Comment also asserted that the 2005 Draft 
Protocol conformed to international law, citing sources of specific interest to 
the IMO.84  These included the IMO mandate as well as various IMO 
assembly resolutions.85  
Perhaps most importantly, the Joint Comment stated that the proposed 
2005 Draft Protocol aligned with the decision made in the Eighty-ninth 
session of the IMO “when developing new instruments or amendments to 
existing ones, to ensure that these are compatible and not in conflict with 
                                           
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
79 Terrorism and Wrecks Dominate Talks, LLOYDS LIST, May 18, 2005. 
80 See description of the ways in which Article 3bis expands the offenses covered in the SUA 
Convention infra Part III.B.  
81 International Maritime Organization, Considerations of a Draft Protocol of 2005 to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Oct. 14, 2005, 
art. 3bis [hereinafter 2005 Draft Protocol to the SUA Convention]. 
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other instruments of international law and that they cannot be interpreted or 
used in a way that conflicts with such instruments.”86 
The Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties met 
October 10-14, 2005. 87  In accordance with IMO standard procedure, it was 
open to both IMO member states and to members of the U.N. and its 
specialized agencies.88  After more than three years of negotiations, the 2005 
Draft Protocol was opened for signature on February 14, 2006.89  The United 
States signed the Draft 2005 Protocol on February 17, 2006.90  It will enter 
into force ninety days following the date of signature of the twelfth country 
who “signs it without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval 
(or deposits an instrument to that effect).”91    
B. The 2005 Draft Protocol Expands the Scope of the SUA Convention, 
Increasing the Types of Forbidden Acts and Establishing a Set of 
Nonflag-State Ship-Boarding Procedures 
The 2005 Draft Protocol amends the SUA Convention. Therefore, all 
state parties to the 2005 Draft Protocol must also, as a prerequisite, be 
parties to the SUA Convention.92  According to the United States, it creates 
one of the first international frameworks whose purpose is to “combat[] and 
prosecute[] anyone who uses a ship . . . as a means to carry out a terrorist 
attack, or who transports terrorists . . . by ship.”93  The two provisions of the 
2005 Draft Protocol most pertinent to this comment are Article 3bis and 
Article 8bis.  
Article 3bis of the 2005 Draft Protocol, along with Articles 3ter and 
3quater, expands the list of offenses covered by the Article 3 of the SUA 
Convention, widening its prescriptive scope.94  Terrorist actions prohibited 
by Article 3bis span a wide range of activities—from the use of a ship as a 
weapon to the use of a ship as a mode of transport of terrorist material to the 
targeting of a ship in a terrorist attack.95 
                                           
86 Id. 
87 Oil Spill Intelligence Report, supra note 67 at 1.  
88 Summary of IMO Conventions, supra note 61. 
89 News from the Washington File International Conference Amends Maritime Treaties on Unlawful 
Act, STATE DEP’T DOCUMENTS, Oct. 27, 2005 [hereinafter News from the Washington File]. 
90 U.S. Signs the Protocols to the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Feb. 17, 2006, available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/61506.htm. 
91 Id. 
92 2005 Draft Protocol to the SUA Convention, supra note 81, preamble. 
93 News from the Washington File, supra note 89.  
94 2005 Draft Protocol to the SUA Convention, supra note 81, art. 3bis. 
95 Id. 
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Although it increases the scope of possible offenses, Article 3bis also 
includes important safeguards meant to protect innocent seafarers from 
prosecution.96  The 2005 Draft Protocol does not allow the criminal 
prosecution of seafarers who do not know about illegal conduct on their 
vessels and who have not intentionally participated in such illegal conduct.97  
Article 8bis of the 2005 Draft Protocol provides a mechanism through 
which the international community may enforce Article 3bis.  It outlines a 
set of nonflag-state boarding procedures applicable to any vessel traveling 
“seaward of any State’s territorial sea” given reasonable grounds to suspect 
the vessel’s involvement in violations of Article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater.98 
C. Article 3bis, Article 3ter, and Article 3quater of the 2005 Draft 
Protocol Expand the Activities Prohibited by Article 3 of the SUA 
Convention 
Articles 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater supplement Article 3 of the SUA 
Convention.  They create additional offenses that will be applicable to all 
nations that sign the 2005 Draft Protocol.  
Article 3bis may be split into three sections: Article 3bis(1)(a), Article 
3bis(1)(b), and Article 3bis(2).99  Article 3bis(1)(a) prohibits four types of 
activities when they are committed “to intimidate a population, or to compel 
a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing 
any act.”100  First, an individual may not “use[] against or on a ship or 
discharge[] from a ship any explosive, radioactive material or BCN weapon 
in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or 
damage.”101  Article 1(1)(d) of the 2005 Draft Protocol defines BCN 
weapons as biological weapons, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, and 
“other nuclear explosive devices.”102  
Second, an individual may not discharge “oil, liquefied natural gas, or 
other hazardous or noxious substance[s]” from a ship when the discharge is 
“likely to cause death or serious injury or damage.”103  Third, an individual 
may not “use[] a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or 
damage.”104  Finally, an individual may not threaten, conditionally or non-
                                           
96 U.S. Consideration of a Draft Protocol, supra note 74 at para. 7.  
97 Id. at para. 7, 9. 
98 2005 Draft Protocol to the SUA Convention, supra note 81, art. 8bis.  
99 Id., art. 3bis. 
100 Id., art. 3bis(1)(a).  
101 Id., art. 3bis(1)(a)(i).  
102 Id., art. 1(1)(d).  
103 Id., art. 3bis(1)(a)(ii). 
104 Id., art. 3bis(1)(a)(iii). 
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conditionally, to commit any of the three actions previously mentioned in 
Article 3bis(1)(a).105  Both Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 3bis(1)(b) include 
the requirement of intentionality; the offending individual must act 
“unlawfully and intentionally.”106 
While Article 3bis(1)(a) deals with a ship’s direct involvement, as an 
aggressor or as a target, in maritime terrorism, Article 3bis(1)(b) focuses on 
the transportation of materials that could be used in a terrorist attack.  It 
prohibits the shipping of BCN weapons, source material not covered under 
the International Atomic Energy Agency’s comprehensive safeguards 
agreement, other “explosive or radioactive material” to be used in a terrorist 
attack or a threatened terrorist attack, and “any equipment, materials or 
software or related technology” that is intended to contribute to “the design, 
manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon.”107   
Article 3bis(2) relates back to Article 3bis(1)(b).  It creates safeguards, 
defining situations when the 2005 Draft Protocol does not prohibit the 
shipping of nuclear materials normally covered under Article 3bis(1)(b).108  
Article 3ter prohibits the intentional maritime transport of any person 
who has violated “[A]rticles 3, 3bis or 3quater or any offence set forth in 
any treaty listed in the Annex” of the 2005 Draft Protocol.109  Liability under 
Article 3ter rests upon the transporting parties’ knowledge of the 
individual’s violation and their intent to help the violator “evade criminal 
prosecution.”110 
Article 3quater supplements Articles 3, 3bis, and 3ter.  It makes it an 
offense to “intentionally injure[] or kill[] any person” in conjunction with a 
violation of “[A]rticle 3, paragraph 1, [A]rticle 3bis, or [A]rticle 3ter.”111  In 
addition, it prohibits attempts to violate “[A]rticle 3, paragraph 1, [A]rticle 
3bis, subparagraphs 1(a)(i), (ii) or (iii), or subparagraph (a)” of Article 
3quater.112  Finally, it states that individuals may not participate, organize, 
direct, or contribute to a violation of “[A]rticle 3, [A]rticle 3bis, [A]rticle 
3ter or subparagraph (a) or (b) of” Article 3quater.113     
This comment advocates for the incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a), in 
conjunction with Article 8bis(5)(e), into UNCLOS Part VII.  It argues for the 
                                           
105 Id., art. 3bis(1)(a)(iv). 
106 Id., art. 3bis(1). 
107 Id., art. 3bis(1)(b).  
108 Id., art. 3bis(2). 
109 Id., art. 3ter. 
110 Id. 
111 Id., art. 3quater(a). 
112 Id., art. 3quater(b). 
113 Id., arts. 3quater(c), (d), and (e). 
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creation of a nonflag-state right of visit given reasonable grounds to suspect 
a ship’s involvement in an act of maritime terrorism, whether the ship is 
attacking another ship or being used as a weapon.  It does not propose 
incorporation of Articles 3bis(1)(b), 3bis(2), 3ter, or 3quater into UNCLOS 
Part VII because they would excessively widen the number of situations 
during which a nonflag-state right of visit on the high seas would exist.  As 
discussed above, Articles 3bis(1)(b), 3bis(2), 3ter, and 3quater focus on 
issues of transportation and other activities that, though related, are also 
peripheral to maritime terrorism.  In recognition of the international rights of 
flag states, a nonflag-state right of visit on the high seas should only exist 
given reasonable suspicion of a limited set of actions directly connected to 
maritime terrorism and codified in Article 3bis(1)(a).   
D. Article 8bis(5)(d) and Article 8bis(5)(e) of the 2005 Draft Protocol 
Establish Two Alternate Nonflag-State Ship-Boarding Procedures that 
Enforce Article 3, Article 3bis, Article 3ter, and Article 3quater 
Article 8bis outlines the procedure that a nonflag state must follow 
when boarding a vessel “located seaward of any State’s territorial sea.”114  It 
focuses on the boarding of vessels that have violated, are violating, or are 
about to violate one of the offenses established by Article 3, Article 3bis, 
Article 3ter, or Article 3quater.115  Thus, Article 8bis deals with offenses that 
were committed in the past, that are being committed currently, and that may 
be committed in the future.   
This comment focuses on two of the different ship boarding 
procedures outlined in Article 8bis—Article 8bis(5)(d) and Article 
8bis(5)(e).  It examines both provisions within the context of Article 8bis(6), 
Article 8bis (7), and Article 8bis(8). 
1. Article 8bis(5)(d) and Article 8bis(5)(e) Do Not Require Flag-State 
Approval on a Case-by-Case Basis 
When a party to the 2005 Draft Protocol deposits its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession with the IMO, it has the 
option of issuing different kinds of approval that grant permission for 
nonflag-state boarding.  This comment focuses on Article 8bis(5)(d) and 
Article 8bis(5)(e), both of which allow nonflag states to board vessels given 
a specific set of circumstances.116  Because flag-state approval under Article 
                                           
114 Id., art. 8bis. 
115 Id. 
116 2005 Draft Protocol to the SUA Convention, supra note 81, art. 8bis(5)(e).   
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8bis(5)(d) and Article 8bis(5)(e) is not needed on a case-by-case basis, 
neither article requires the permission of the flag state to be given117 each 
time a nonflag state conducts a high-seas boarding. 
Under Article 8bis(5)(d), flag states may grant nonflag states 
authorization to board and search their vessels if they have not responded to 
the requesting state “within four hours of acknowledgement of receipt of a 
request to confirm nationality.”  
Alternatively, Article 8bis(5)(e) creates a much broader approval.  
Voluntarily given by flag states, Article 8bis(5)(e) approval allows for 
nonflag-state boarding anytime the requesting state has reasonable grounds 
to suspect that a ship has violated, is violating, or is about to violate Article 
3, Article 3bis, Article 3ter, or Article 3quater.  Once a flag state has issued 
the second type of approval, the party may choose to withdraw it at any 
point.118  Upon boarding, the nonflag state may “search a ship, its cargo and 
persons on board” and “question the persons on board in order to determine 
if an offence under article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is 
about to be committed.”119  
This comment advocates for the incorporation of Article 8bis(5)(e) 
into UNCLOS Part VII because it is broader than the Article 8bis(5)(d) ship 
boarding procedure.  Article 8bis(5)(d) gives requesting nonflag states the 
right of visit only if they have requested permission to board and have not 
received an answer from the flag state within four hours.  Article 8bis(5)(e), 
however, creates a nonflag-state right of visit anytime there is a reasonable 
suspicion of a vessel’s participation in terrorist activity.  Because the need to 
prevent maritime terrorism is too great to be limited by predetermined wait 
periods, the international community should incorporate Article 8bis(5)(e) 
rather than Article 8bis(5)(d) into UNCLOS Part VII. 
2. Articles 8bis(6), 8bis(7), and 8bis(8) Provide the Context Within 
Which Article 8bis(5)(e) Should Be Interpreted 
Article 8bis(5)(e) provides a limited degree of power to nonflag states, 
allowing only for the boarding and searching of a vessel and the questioning 
of all individuals on board.  In instances where the boarding state discovers 
violations of Article 3, Article 3bis, Article 3ter, or Article 3quater, Article 
                                           
117 Article 8bis(5)(e) is different from Article 8bis(5)(b), which requires the requesting party to ask 
the flag state “for authorization to board and to take appropriate measures.” 
118 2005 Draft Protocol to the SUA Convention, supra note 81, art. 8bis(5)(e). 
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8bis(5)(e) does not address the jurisdictional issues involved in the resulting 
arrests and prosecutions. 
Article 8bis(6) fills the jurisdictional gap unaddressed by Article 
8bis(5)(e).  Once a requesting state has discovered evidence of violations of 
Article 3, Article 3bis, Article 3ter, or Article 3quater, “the flag [s]tate may 
authorize the requesting Party to detain the ship, cargo and persons on board 
pending receipt of disposition instructions from the flag [s]tate.”120  A 
boarding state that has received flag-state permission and has detained the 
ship, cargo or person on board must inform the flag state “of the results of a 
boarding, search and detention” as well as “of the discovery of evidence of 
illegal conduct” unrelated to the SUA Convention.121   
Article 8bis(8) preserves the right of a flag state “to exercise 
jurisdiction over a detained ship, cargo or other items on board, including 
seizure, forfeiture, arrest and prosecution.”122  Therefore, even if a nonflag 
state is allowed to board and detain a vessel, the flag state retains jurisdiction 
over arrest and prosecution.  A flag state may choose to consent to the 
exercise of jurisdiction by another state “having jurisdiction under article 6” 
of the SUA Convention as long as such consent is allowable under “its 
constitution and laws.”123  
According to Article 8bis(7), flag states have the power to impose 
conditions upon the actions of nonflag states as related to steps taken in 
conformity with Article 8bis(5) or Article 8bis(6).124  Possible conditions 
include requiring additional information from the requesting party and 
“conditions relating to responsibility for and the extent of measure to be 
taken.”125  Requesting states may bypass the flag state’s conditions under 
only two circumstances: “when necessary to relieve imminent danger to the 
lives of persons or where those measures derive from relevant bilateral or 
multilateral agreements.”126  The flag state must still give permission for 
arrests and prosecutions on a case-by-case basis. 
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IV. ARTICLE 3BIS(1)(A) AND ARTICLE 8BIS(5)(E) ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
An attempt to codify an international rule against maritime terrorism, 
Article 3bis(1)(a) is clearly in conformity with international law.  Article 
8bis(5)(e) also conforms with international law, including the legal 
framework established by UNCLOS Articles 92 and 110.  
A. The Article 8bis(5)(e) Ship-Boarding Procedure Complies with 
UNCLOS Article 92 and UNCLOS Article 110 
Article 8bis(5)(e) conforms to the international legal framework 
established by UNCLOS Articles 92 and 110.  Both articles allow flag states 
to enter into international treaties, granting a nonflag state the right to board 
their vessels on the high seas.  Article 8bis(5)(e) is clearly part of such an 
international agreement.  It follows, therefore, that it is in compliance with 
UNCLOS.   
B. Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) Attempt to Preserve 
International Peace and Security and Conform with International Law 
Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) should be interpreted within 
the context of the 2005 Draft Protocol.  According to Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context.”127  
The preamble to the 2005 Draft Protocol includes a number of 
references that both individually and taken as a whole suggest the 
Diplomatic Conference’s desire to conform to established international law.  
To begin with, it acknowledges “that terrorist acts threaten international 
peace and security.”128  In addition, it specifically recalls United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1373 (“Resolution 1373”).129  Adopted on 
September 28, 2001, Resolution 1373 begins by stating that “any act of 
international terrorism, constitute[s] a threat to international peace and 
security.”130  
The continued references to threats to “international peace and 
security” are noteworthy in two respects.  First, UNCLOS Article 88 
                                           
127 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27.  
128 2005 Draft Protocol to the SUA Convention, supra note 81, at preamble. 
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explicitly reserves the high seas “for peaceful purposes.”131  Activities that 
threaten international peace and security are clearly in violation of the 
requirement that the high seas be used only for peaceful purposes.  Second, 
Article One of the Charter of the United Nations states that one of the 
purposes of the United Nations is “[t]o maintain international peace and 
security.”132  It is inferable from the references to international peace and 
security in the preamble of the 2005 Protocol that the purpose behind Article 
8bis is consistent with UNCLOS and with the Charter of the United Nations.  
Resolution 1373 provides additional support for the international 
legitimacy of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e).  Paragraph 3(c) of 
Resolution 1373 calls for international cooperation “particularly through 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and 
suppress terrorist attacks and [to] take action against perpetrators of such 
acts.”133  While Article 3bis(1)(a) outlines the maritime terrorist activity 
forbidden by the 2005 Draft Protocol, Article 8bis(5)(e) enforces the rules 
prescribed by Article 3bis(1)(a).  Assuming that Article 3bis(1)(a) and 
Article 8bis(5)(e) are consistent with international law, it follows that they 
are the type of cooperative action sanctioned by Resolution 1373.  
V. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD INCORPORATE ARTICLE 
3BIS(1)(A) AND ARTICLE 8BIS(5)(E) INTO UNCLOS PART VII, 
ALLOWING FOR A NONFLAG-STATE RIGHT OF VISIT ON THE HIGH SEAS 
GIVEN REASONABLE GROUNDS TO SUSPECT A VESSEL IS INVOLVED IN 
TERRORIST ACTIVITY 
The international community should amend UNCLOS Part VII, 
incorporating Article 3bis(1)(a) as a prescriptive rule and Article 8bis(5)(e) 
as the mechanism through which to enforce that rule.  This would create an 
additional exception to the general principle of flag-state control on the high 
seas.  Maritime terrorism has become an increasingly dangerous threat.  To 
ensure adequate protection against such violence, a state must be allowed to 
board a vessel on the high seas, even if the vessel is flying a flag other than 
its own, given reasonable grounds to suspect the ship’s participation in 
maritime terrorism. 
Protection against maritime terrorism is too important a task to be 
subject to existing inconsistencies in enforcement.  Unfortunately, flag states 
exert varying levels of regulation and control over their ships on the high 
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seas.  To combat the resulting weakness in maritime security, the 
international community should ensure that it has a uniform ability to board 
ships suspected of involvement in maritime terrorism.  
The ability of nonflag states to board vessels on the high seas 
suspected of participation in terrorism would help to protect against 
maritime terrorism in two ways.  It would increase the ability of the 
international community to respond to potential threats, and it would offer 
further deterrence against potential maritime terrorists.  The best way to 
accomplish this goal is to incorporate Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 
8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII.  
The incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into Part 
VII of UNCLOS would apply only to ships sailing on the high seas.  Part 
VII of UNCLOS focuses exclusively on the high seas; vessels traveling in 
other portions of the ocean would be unaffected.  While many of the 
potential targets of maritime terrorism are not located on the high seas, 
increased international scrutiny on the high seas remains an important tool in 
the prevention of such attacks.  The world needs to stop maritime terrorists 
before they enter into the territorial waters and the ports of coastal states. 
The 2005 Draft Protocol is a step in the right direction.  Its approach 
to improving maritime security, however, is too timid.  In the 2005 Draft 
Protocol, the Article 8bis(5)(e) ship-boarding provision is optional, one of 
several procedures from which flag states may choose.  In addition, there is 
no guarantee that the 2005 Draft Protocol will impact enough nations to be 
truly effective.  
The United Nations “has adopted a pro-active approach” in its 
struggle against terrorism.134  The international community should extend 
this same approach to the challenge posed by maritime terrorism and 
incorporate Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII. 
This would result in a specific definition of maritime terrorism and in an 
appropriate response, one that is necessary to prevent terrorist attacks.   
A. The International Community Should Incorporate Article 3bis(1)(a) 
and Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII Through the Amendment 
Procedures of UNCLOS  Article 312 or UNCLOS Article 313 
The international community should incorporate Article 3bis(1)(a) and 
Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII pursuant to UNCLOS Article 312 
or UNCLOS Article 313.  At its creation, UNCLOS was intended to be 
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“comprehensive in scope and universal in participation.”135  To ensure that 
the convention would remain “capable of further evolution,” the 
international community included articles allowing for amendment and 
incorporation of international agreements and standards.136  The nations 
involved in the development of UNCLOS stressed that the amendment 
procedures represented a balance between the “overriding principle of [the] 
preservation” of UNCLOS as a “package deal” and a “right of amendment” 
implied by a nation’s acceptance of the convention.137  UNCLOS may be 
amended through Article 312 or through a simplified procedure codified in 
Article 313.  
UNCLOS Article 312 allows party states to propose amendments 
“[a]fter the expiry of a period of 10 years from the date” that UNCLOS 
entered into force.138  The ten-year waiting period may have been an attempt 
to “prevent immediate challenges to the package deal regime” of the 
convention.139  To propose an amendment, a state party must first give the 
secretary general of the United Nations a written copy of the proposed 
amendment and request that he convene a “conference to consider such 
proposed amendment[].”140  The proposed amendment is then circulated 
among all state parties.141  The secretary general convenes a conference to 
consider the proposed amendment if, within a year, “not less than one half of 
the State Parties reply favorably to the request.”142 
A conference to consider a proposed amendment to UNCLOS, will, 
unless participants decide otherwise, apply the same “decision-making 
procedure” as was utilized at the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea.143  In addition, conference participants must “make every 
effort to reach agreement on any amendments by way of consensus.”144  The 
creation of consensus is important, as UNCLOS Article 316 requires the 
proposed amendment’s ratification or accession “by two thirds of the State 
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Parties or by 60 State Parties, whichever is greater,” before it can enter into 
force.145 
A state party may also propose an amendment through the simplified 
procedures of UNCLOS Article 313.  Pursuant to UNCLOS Article 313, the 
secretary general will circulate the party’s proposed amendment to all state 
parties.146  If, within a year of its initial circulation, no state party objects to 
the proposed amendment, it “shall be considered [to be] adopted.”147  The 
simplicity of UNCLOS Article 313 may “have been intended to allow 
amendments necessary to keep the convention up to date to be made at any 
point.”148  
Proposed amendments, emerging according to both Article 312 and 
Article 313, are “open for signature by State Parties for 12 months from the 
date of adoption.”149  Pursuant to UNCLOS Article 316(1), they enter into 
force “on the thirtieth day following the deposit of instruments of ratification 
or accession by two thirds of the State Parties or by 60 State Parties, 
whichever is greater.”150  After an amendment has entered into force, any 
state that then becomes a party to UNCLOS will, unless is has expressed 
otherwise, also be a member to the amendment.151  
As of spring 2006, no state had attempted to amend UNCLOS using 
the procedures set forth within UNCLOS Article 312 or UNCLOS Article 
313.152  This may be because of the high bar set by UNCLOS Article 316, 
specifically its requirement of ratification or accession “by two thirds of the 
State Parties or by 60 State Parties, whichever is greater” before an 
amendment may enter into force.  The amendment proposed by this 
comment, incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into 
UNCLOS Part VII, would be the first attempt to amend UNCLOS pursuant 
to UNCLOS Article 312 or UNCLOS Article 313.  
Worldwide consensus is needed in the fight against maritime 
terrorism.  The success of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) depends 
upon the number of countries that embrace them.  David H. Anderson, a 
former judge at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, argues that 
international usage of the UNCLOS amendment procedures is “a question of 
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politics and diplomacy.”153  The UNCLOS Article 316 amendment 
requirements would encourage the international community to employ the 
power of politics and diplomacy to increase the ratification and accession of 
Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e). 
The incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into 
UNCLOS Part VII, as the convention’s first proposed amendment, would 
also be symbolic of the international community’s commitment to stop 
maritime terrorism.  When it created UNCLOS Articles 312 and 313, the 
international community stressed that UNCLOS should be able to adapt to 
“technological advances” and “economic, political and juridical” changes.154  
The increasing need to respond to the threat posed by maritime terrorism is 
the type of adaptation envisioned by the UNCLOS creators. 
B. Incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into 
UNCLOS Part VII Would Ensure Conformity with International Law, 
Uniformity, and Wide-Scale Observance 
Incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into 
UNCLOS Part VII would solve three problems inherent in the 2005 Draft 
Protocol’s maritime terrorism ship-boarding provisions.  First, it would 
create a general nonflag-state right of visit given reasonable suspicion of a 
vessel’s participation in maritime terrorist activity.  Second, it would 
decrease the potential for overlaps and possible inconsistencies inherent in a 
system that now relies on multiple bilateral and multilateral treaties.  Finally, 
it would separate the issue of maritime terrorism, as defined by Article 
3bis(1)(a), from more contentious portions of the 2005 Draft Protocol.  This 
would increase the probability international consensus supporting a nonflag-
state right of visit on the high seas given reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s 
involvement in maritime terrorism.  
1. Incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into 
UNCLOS Part VII Would Create a Nonflag-State Right of Visit Given 
Reasonable Suspicion of a Vessel’s Involvement in Maritime Terrorism 
The inclusion of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) in UNCLOS 
Part VII would create a right of visit given reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s 
involvement in maritime terrorist activity.  This would dramatically improve 
the legal procedure codified in the 2005 Draft Protocol.  The 2005 Draft 
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Protocol does not require state parties to grant nonflag states a right of visit 
given reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s involvement in maritime terrorism.  
Rather, it explicitly allows flag states to refuse to grant such permission.  In 
addition, it permits flag states that choose to grant nonflag states permission 
to board one of their vessels to do so in one of two ways—on a general basis 
or on an ad-hoc basis. 
As written, the 2005 Draft Protocol allows a state party to choose to 
grant a nonflag-state right of visit only if the nonflag state has requested 
permission and has failed to receive a response “within four hours of 
acknowledgement of receipt of [its] request.”155  Under this option, not only 
must the nonflag state wait for four hours before exercising the right of visit, 
but the flag state retains the right to deny its request.  Both of these 
requirements are impediments to international security in the case of a vessel 
reasonably suspected of participation in terrorist activities.  Given suspicion 
of a vessel’s involvement in maritime terrorism, a nonflag state should have 
the right of visit immediately, just as it would in cases of piracy, slavery, or 
illegal broadcasting.  
2. Incorporating Articles 3bis(1)(a) and 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part 
VII Would Create a Uniform Legal Rule Focused on Maritime 
Terrorism 
To be successful, the world’s counterterrorism strategy must have an 
intelligible prescriptive foundation and utilize one coherent high-seas ship-
boarding procedure to be followed when a vessel on the high seas is 
suspected of participating in maritime terrorist activity.  Boarding states 
must be able to rely on a uniform protocol, a protocol whose existence 
would also serve as a deterrent against maritime terrorism.  
There is no uniform antiterrorism ship-boarding procedure under the 
current legal framework.  Instead, a series of bilateral and multilateral 
treaties attempt to work within the structure established by UNCLO Articles 
92 and 110.  The 2005 Draft Protocol symbolizes a larger movement to 
broaden the scope of allowable nonflag-state ship boarding on the high seas 
in order to confront evolving maritime security threats. 
For example, the Proliferation Security Initiative (“PSI”) is an 
international effort “to enhance and expand . . . efforts to prevent the flow of 
WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials on the ground, in the air, 
and at sea, to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation 
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concern.”156  By June 2005, more than sixty nations were in support of the 
PSI.157  Like the SUA Convention and the 2005 Draft Protocol, participation 
in the PSI is voluntary.158  Although it has spawned the creation of six 
bilateral ship-boarding agreements,159 the PSI provides no legal authority 
supporting high-seas interdictions that have not been authorized by the flag 
state.160 
Amending UNCLOS Part VII to incorporate Article 3bis(1)(a) and 
Article 8bis(5)(e) would create a uniform nonflag-state right of visit given 
reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s participation in maritime terrorism.  As 
this comment previously discussed, pursuant to UNCLOS Article 316, an 
amendment requires the ratification of two-thirds of UNCLOS states parties.  
Therefore, if the international community were to incorporate Article 
3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII through 
amendment, it would effectively be crafting an international consensus, 
creating a uniform procedure to be followed in instances of suspected  
participation in maritime terrorism. 
3. Incorporation into UNCLOS Part VII Would Increase the Influence of 
Articles 3bis(1)(a) and 8bis(5)(e) 
Incorporation into UNCLOS Part VII would increase the influence of 
Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) by creating a uniform nonflag-state 
right of visit on the high seas given a reasonable suspicion that a ship is 
involved in terrorist activity.  It would also broaden the number of states that 
are likely to embrace Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e). 
Despite the urgency of the situation, the scope of the 2005 Draft 
Protocol is extremely narrow.  It does not add an additional UNCLOS 
Article 110 right of visit for situations in which a vessel is suspected of 
participation in maritime terrorism.  Instead, it simply creates “a voluntary 
expedited interdiction procedure.”161  Amending UNCLOS to incorporate 
Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII would 
prevent states that are party to the amendment from refusing to allow a 
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nonflag state a right of visit given reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s 
involvement in maritime terrorism. 
In addition, the 2005 Draft Protocol, when it enters into force, will 
have the power to bind only those states that have agreed to become party to 
it.162  There is a risk that “states not party to treaties like the 1968 Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)” will refuse to sign the 
2005 Draft Protocol.163  Pakistan, India, and Israel have all “made clear their 
opposition to aspects of the Protocol . . . which in effect give[] recognized 
nuclear-weapon states a privileged status vis-à-vis other states.”164  
The incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into 
UNCLOS Part VII would divorce the issue of a nonflag-state right of visit 
on the high seas given reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s involvement in 
maritime terrorism from the more controversial sections of the 2005 Draft 
Protocol.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The rising threat of maritime terrorism is a danger that the world 
cannot ignore.  The secretary general of the International Maritime 
Organization, Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, recognized the danger that 
terrorism poses to maritime security at the close of the October conference 
adopting the 2005 Protocol.165  He stated that with regard to the 2005 Draft 
Protocol, “[t]he usual request for States to become Parties” is transformed 
into “an urgent plea.”166  He warned that the international community is 
“running a race against time” as it attempts to ensure maritime safety.167 
Though the 2005 Draft Protocol was created to address the challenges 
of maritime terrorism, it is too timid in its approach to nonflag-state ship 
boarding on the high seas given reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s 
participating in maritime terrorism.  It attempts to increase maritime security 
while remaining within the current UNCLOS framework.  The international 
community must be willing to amend UNCLOS, incorporating Article 
3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII.  
To confront the danger posed by maritime terrorism, the world should 
provide nonflag states a high-seas right to visit given reasonable grounds to 
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suspect that a vessel has engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in 
maritime terrorism as defined by Article 3bis(1)(a).  The current reliance on 
flag-state enforcement has created weaknesses in the world’s maritime 
security regime.  Flag states, particularly flags of convenience, have little 
incentive to ensure compliance with international norms.  The international 
community must ensure maritime security by filling the gaps that have 
opened as a result of poor flag-state enforcement.  
If a nonflag state has reasonable grounds to suspect a vessel’s 
participation in terrorist activity, it must have the power to board it before it 
reaches its intended target.  If the world fails to take this step, a nation may 
be faced with two dangerous options—to let a ship go, risking possible 
violence, or to violate international law.  No nation should be forced to make 
this choice, a quandary that may be prevented by the incorporation of Article 
3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII.   
 
